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EQUITY WITH GROWTH IN TAIWAN:

HOW "SPECIAL" IS THE "SPECIAL CASE"?*

Gustav Ranis
Yale University

I. Introduction

This paper is intended to review some of the principal findings of
recently completed research on income distribution in Taiwan, 1 to present
some of the policy conclusions which seem to emerge from that analysis, and
to comment on the applicability or non-applicability of the lessons of that
particular case to other presumably "less special" developing economy situa
tions.
Although the research on Taiwan spans the entire 1953-1972 period, our
major analytical focus was on the years after 1964 for which reliable family
income and expenditure surveys are available.
that in the early

1

We started with the "fact"

5Os Taiwan apparently experienced a distribution of in-

come--as measured by the Gini Coefficient 2 --in the upper reaches (above .5)
of contemporary LDC experience, that the Gini apparently fell substantially
(to above .4) by the end of that decade, and fell much further (to near .3)
by the time the superior data begin, in 1964.

Secondly, we may note, and

with a much greater degree of confidence, that the level of the Gini between
1964 and 1972 held more or less steady until 1968, declining further there
after.

1

see John Fei, Gustav Ranis and Shirley W. Y. Kuo, Equity with Growth:
~he Taiwan Case, forthcoming. For a brief summary version--9-lso see_our
Growth and the Family Distribution of Income by Factor Components", Quarterly
Journal of Economics, (November, 1977).
2
we recognize that ~here are other indicators, better for some (and worse
for other) analytical purposes. Also, that absolute, rather than relative,
poverty may be what moves people--and governments. But this is not the appro
priate place for a discussion of these issues.
*This is a revised version of a paper presented at the World Bank's
Bellagio Conference on Income Distribution, April, 1977.
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Over the same two decades we may note a marked acceleration of alre_ady
respectable rates of per capita income growth, from 2.7% annually in the
'SOs, to 5.8% annually in the '60s.

There can be little daub~ in other words,

that the so-called inverse U-shaped or Kuznets effect was apparently avoided
in Taiwan during a period of unusually rapid growth, and it is undoubtedly
this fact, running counter to the generally prevailing evidence, 3 which
renders the Taiwan case of such particular interest.

Presentation of one

thoroughly documented counter-example should at least force the dominant
school of "trade-off pessimists" to place more reliance on analytical neces
sities rather than circumstantial evidence.
Obviously no two countries are ever "the same"--either from the point
of view of their economic or institutional structure.

The analysis of a

successful counter-example to the general rule in the social sciences can
not carry the same power as in mathematics, but should, nevertheless, be
instructive--even if only to underline the specific special features which
render the particular experience non-transferable.

Neither the (frequent)

reaction that Taiwan is a U.S. satellite inhabited by superior cultural
achievers and therefore irrelevant--nor the (less frequent) response that
every LDC could imitate the Taiwan experience if it only had the will to do
so--is appropriate or particularly helpful.

More helpful--if also more

elusive--is the attempt to differentiate between those elements of "non
·transferability" which relate to obstacles "in nature" versus those relating
to obstacles "in man".

While we obviously cannot hope to "settle" such

3

Mustered cross-sectionally by S. Kuznets,"Economic Growth and Income
Inequality~ American Economic Review 45, no. 1, 1955, I.Adelman and c. Morris.
Economic Growth and Social 8quity in Developing Countries, 1973,
F. Paukert, "Income Distribution at Different Levels of Development: A Survey
of Evidence~' International Lab-our Review 108, 1973 and historically by
A. Fishlow, "Brazilian size distribution of Income~' American Economic Review Q2,
19 72, R. Weisskoff; ''Income Distribution and Economic Growth in Puerto Rico,
Argentina, and Mexico~' Review of Income and Wealth, 1970 and A. Berry· and M. Urrutia
Income Distribution in Colombia, Yale University Press, 1976.
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weighty questions in the context of this paper, we do intend to try to pry
open the door just slightly to a fuller understanding.
Accordingly we will proceed by summarizing our analytical findings and
policy conclusions for the case of Taiwan (in Section II) and conclude with
a discussion of the transferability/non-transferability issue (Section III).
We will endeavor to enrich the latter by reference to more "typical" LDC
situations such as, for example, those of Colombia and the Philippines.
Since to date no similar exhaustive analysis of such other country cases has,
however, been undertaken by us, this discussion will necessarily have to re
main at a more general, impressionistic level.

It will nevertheless permit

us to ruminate about the relevant differences, and similarities, between
Taiwan and some less "deviant" LDC, call it "Colphil," and the extent to
which these can, or cannot, be overcome by policy actions.
II.

The Taiwan Case:

Findings and Conclusions

Although this is clearly not the place to detail the analytical basis
of our work a brief word on methodology is required to render such a summary
of findings half-way comprehensible. 4

The data base in Taiwan pe_rmits us to

differentiate between rural and urban households and among the major sources
of incom~.

Urban families are principally ·engaged in industry and service

activities generating wage and property income; rural families, on the other
hand, are engaged in both agricultural production, generating a merged "agri
cultural income", and non-agricultural production.activities, generating wage
and property incomes.

Dealing with urban, rural and all families separately,

the ap.alytical device used is to establish the impact of growth on changes

4

The interested reader is referred to Chapter VII of Equity with Growth:
The Taiwan Case, op. cit.
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in the size distribution of income via a method of decomposition into additive
factor Ginis, in which the distribution of each component income source and
its weight in the total are essential ingredients.

Changes in the overall

Gini can in this way be analyzed both qualitatively and quantitatively in
terms of three causal factors:

a "functional distribution effect", traced

to changes in the functional distribution of income, as between capital and
labor; a "reallocation effect", traced to the change in the share of agricul
tural income in total income, signifying the extent to which a shift in the
center of gravity in the two-sector economy has taken place; and a "factor
Gini effect", traced to changes in the inequality of the various factor
incomes (wage income, property income, agricultural income), taken separately.
The first two effects can be linked up analytically with development
theory, via the impact of changes in factor proportions and the strength
and bias of innovations, in the first case, and via the impact of the pace
of inter-sectoral labor and output reallocation, in the second.

The third

effect can be linked to changes in the distribution of human and.physical
assets across families, which is, in tum, related to differential saving
and educational expenditure behavior over time; although we also make the effort
to examine the underlying causes, for example, of wage income inequality-the most important component of total family income--this area of inquiry
is admittedly less firmly related to established theory at this stage of our
knowledge.
Our empirical findings

5

5

at the aggregate level clearly indicate the

Household survey data for all of Taiwan for 1964, 1968, 1970, 1971
and 1972 are used. For 1.964, it is not possible to distinguish between urban
and rural families.
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existence of a turning point around 1968.

The Gini for all households,

virtually constant before 1968 (+1.6% over four years),declines markedly
after 1968 (-11.1% over four years).

Virtually the same is true for the

urban households, taken separately, with the relevant changes at +1.9%
over two years and -14.6% over four years, respectively.

On

the other

hand, as far as rural households are concerned, significant improvement
before 1968 (-11% over two years) gives way to virtual constancy after
·1968 (+.1% over four years).
These results lend powerful support to the result, independently es
tablished elsewhere 6 , that Taiwan reached a significant milestone with
respect to growth, near the end of the '60s.

What we are, of course,

referring to is the gradual ending of the labor surplus condition as demon
strated by the change in the rate of increase of unskilled wages before and
after 1968, which is apparently relevant for income distribution as well
as growth.

Consequently

our basic thesis, that income distribution is

essentially a growth-sensitiv e phenomenon and can only be analyzed in the
context of the rules of behavior relevant to the particular subphase of growth
a country has reached, is strongly supported.
We may also note, at a still high level of aggregation, that the credit
for the apparent overall avoidance of the "Kuznets effect", can be laid at
the doorstep of the more dominant sector in each subphase, i.e., on the
rural sector while the unlimited supply of labor condition persisted, and 1
on the urban sector thereafter.

The crucial

part of the story is, of course,

the apparent avoidance of conflict between rapid growth and equitable distri
bution prior to 1968.

Thus, the early favorable attention accorded to the

6
John C.H. Fei and Gustav Ranis, "A Model of Growth and Employment in
the Open Dualistic Economy: The Cases of Korea and Taiwan," Journal of
Development Studies, Vol. 11, No. 2, January, 1975.
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rural sector in Taiwan--dating back to the Japanese colonial period and
substantially reinforced in the

1

60s--clearly represents a policy-relevant

conclusion at this same level of generality.
The three types of "effects" presented above also permit us, however,
to dig a little deeper in terms of the

causes of the unusually favorable

interaction between growth and income distribution observed in Taiwan.
This is accomplished by "de.composing" the total change in the Gini for each
of our groups for any given time period-into that "due to" the change in
the relative non-agricultural wage and property income shares (the "func
tional distribution effect"), that due to the change in the relative size
of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors (the "reallocation effect"),
and that due to the change in the inequality in the distribution of a par!•-1

ticular income component (the "factor Gini effect").

Our empirical findings

at this level were:
1) that for rural households a dominant cause of income distribution
performance, strongly favorable to equality both before and after
1968, is the reallocation effect; and
2) that for urban households a dominant cause, highly unfavorable be
fore and favorable after 1968, is the functional distribution effect.
This in turn tells us that the two more narrowly growth theory-related
effects are not only relevant but also dominant in terms of the income dis
tribution outcome.

Moreover, as we would expect from growth-relevant pheno

mena,d:ifferent forces predominate in each sector.

Specifically, in the urban

sector, the accumulation of capital relative to labor, plus the nature and
strength of technology change, constitute the essence of the industrialization
effort, and it is for this reason that the fate of the distributive shares
constitutes a dominant cause of income distribution equity.

In contrast, for
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rural households, it is the reallocation of labor from agricultural to non
agricultural activities which represents the more crucial development issue
and turns out to be a dominant cause of income distribution performance.
These findings also help us to identify the proper policy focus.

In the

rural sector, the growth of industries and services mutually interacting with
a dynamic agriculture and providing additional employment and income oppor
tunities to members of rural households is crucial; in the urban sector,
such elements as the wage rate, the adoption and adaptation of technology,
plus trade and domestic factors affecting the output mix (among others deter
mining the functional distribution of income) assume major importance.

Taking

this as a point of departure, we are now in a position to take a closer look
at precisely how these various growth-relevant forces impacted on the distri
bution of income in Taiwan.
With respect, first, to the rural families, we find
3) that their agricultural income is consistently more unequally dis
tributed than their non-agricultural income;

7

4) that the share of non-agricultural income in their total income is
both large and rising;
5) that the rural industry and service activities which are the source of
this income are labor-intensive (relative to their urban counterparts),
and increasingly so;

8

and finally,
6) that their agricultural income is also becoming more equally distri
buted over time.

7
What we call a Type I income, increasing more than proportionally with
total family income. Type II income increases less than proportionally with
family income. Type III decreases as total family income increases.
8

.

At least as measured by the relative share of labor to property income.
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Result (3) indicates that in the rural areas the income from the more
"traditional" agricultural pursuits is more unequally distributed than the
income from the more "non-traditional" non-agricultural activities.

In

combination with results (4) and (5), it tells us precisely how the "realloca
tion effect" has operated as the dominant force in improving the distribution
of income among rural families.

The extent to which industrialization in

Taiwan was decentralized and labor-intensive was apparently crucial in
providing a large volume of additional employment opportunities to members
of rural households, especially the poorer ones.
It is especially noteworthy that finding (5), reflected in a relative
share of labor (within non-agricultural income) rising from .66 in 1964 to
.75 in 1968, runs strongly counter to the normal, i.e., Arthur Lewis',assump
tion that labor's share must fall during the unlimited supply of labor phase.
Instead, what happened in Taiwan is that, in spite of relatively low wage
rates, the wage share could rise markedly as poor families had more members
employed, working more hours per week.
With respect to the last finding (6), it is, for reasons already
alluded to, more difficult to be certain of the basic causes here.

It may

be supposed that the three-step 9 land reform program of the early '50s had
a lot to do with the lowering of the agricultural income Gini during that
decade.

For the period of the '60s, on which our full decomposition analy

sis is necessarily concentrated, the explanatory evidence is more likely

.

to reside in the proportionately much heavier application on the smaller
plots (i.e., by the relatively poorer farmers) of multiple cropping patterns
and the introduction of such new, higher valued, and more labor intensive

9

consisting, briefly, of a reduction in rents, sales of public lands,
and a "soil to the tiller" program, with easy terms for tenants and low
compensation prices for landlords.
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crops as mushrooms and asparagus.
The policy implications of the above are both clear and interesting.
Decentralized industrializati on was the by-product of both Japanese colonial
emphasis on the rural sector and of conscious post-war Taiwanese policy.
The former concentrated heavily on roads, irrigation and rural electrifica
tion as part of the effort to extract agricultural surpluses in the form of
rice and sugar for the mother country.
indirect and direct government actions.

The latter exhibited itself in both
In the more important indirect

category must be counted the relatively mild and flexible manner in which the
import substitution package of the '50s was applied, followed by early and
substantial liberalization in the '58-'63 period.

Specifically, between

1953 and 1958, agriculture did not suffer the "customary" severe discrimina
tion and deterioration of its terms of trade,while stabilization was achieved
and protection was kept a reasonably "low" and interest rates at reasonably
"high" levels, at least by international LDC standards; the well-known
"Nineteen ;Elo ints" policy

reforms which followed, particularly with respect

to the foreign trade sector, provided the kind of access for small- and
medium-scale firms--more likely to be rural--seldom encountered elsewhere.
With respect to direct actions, Taiwan early on expanded the rural infra
structure, physical and institutional, left by the Japanese, including an
emphasis on rural (especially paved) roads, an expanded island-wide rail
system, the construction of dispersed industrial estates, bonded factories
and export processing zones within daily reach of rural households, and
the m.aintenance of a policy of equalizing power and fuel rates throughout
the island.

The avoidance of the all-too-frequen tly found direct or
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indirect incentives for concentration and agglomeration is but the other side
of the same coin.
The farmers association structure also served to .facilitate the

inter

sectoral flow of ideas, along with capital, e.g., with respect to agriculture
and processing as well as other domestic raw materials based industries; a
variety of specialized applied industrial institutes and investment centers
were established, avoiding in large measure, as a result of their relative
greater market orientation, the frequently encountered "big breakthrough-white
elephant" syndrome.

Add to this the relatively wide participation of small

landlords in industrial activities--achieved via the proviso that 30% of land
reform compensation was to be made in the form of ex-Japanese industrial
assets--and we have the main elements of a rural industrialization strategy.
Samuel Ho

10

found rural industrial employment rising from 47% to 52% of the

total between 1956 and 1966. The industrial censuses provide similar evidence
in terms of a faster growth of the number of rural than urban establishments
over the entire 1951-1971 period.

While this is not true in output terms,

as late as 1971 39% of Taiwan's producer goods and 61% of her consumer goods
were still produced outside of her five major cities.

During the 1956-66

decade, the share of rural manufacturing employment in total rural employ
ment rose from 8% to 11% and that of commerce and services from 12% to 26%.
Small wonder that the share of rural family income derived from non
agricultural activities could rise from a respectable 33% in 1964 to 53% by
1972.

Even more significant for our purposes is the fact that, for the

poorest families (land area below .5 chia), the percentage of total farm

10

Samuel P. S. Ho, The Rural Non-F_arm.__Sector in Taiwan, The World Bank,
Studies in Employment and Rural Development No. 32, September, 1976.
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family income generated outside of agriculture was close to 70%, while for
the richest families (land area greater than 2 chia), the equivalent figure
was around 25%.

All this was accomplished in large part not by agricultural

workers "leaving the soil"--only 24% of the females working in non-agriculture
and 16% of the males

actually migrated to urban employment;

11

instead,

commuting to work (e.g., by bicycle to the export processing zones) accounted
for 24% of the males and 35% of the females "reallocating", while seasonal
participation was the method for 61% of the

males and 41% of the females.

The choice of relatively labor-intensive production functions and output
mixes in both rural non-agriculture and in such urban activities as export
processing zones, able to attract rural household members on a daily commut
ing basis, reinforced the power of the reallocation effect over time.
With respect to the contribution made via the decline over time of the
high agricultural income Gini (relative to the non-agricultural income Gini),
the policy implications here are somewhat less direct, just as our theory
is less satisfactory.

Early land reform (some very early, i.e. in 1905,

during the Japanese period) undoubtedly helped--probably not so much in terms
of the once-and-for-all change in the structure of assets and rental incomes
as in terms of the resulting greater intensity of land use via multiple and
new crops--in which the poorer farmers once again participated proportionally
more heavily.

One feature of land reform which often leads to a worsening

of the distribution of income was clearly avoided here, i.e. that of the
neglect of (sometimes even creation of new) unemployed landless workers.

11
According to a 1963 JCRR survey, Tsui and Lin, "A Study on Rural Labor
Mobility in Relation to Industrialization and Urbanization in Taiwan", JCRR
Economic Digest Series, No. 16, 1964.
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The ability of the poorest farmers to be absorbed by the burgeoning new agri
cultural and non-agricu ltural rural activities was clearly the crucial causal
element behind the non-Kuznets ian income distributio n path followed by rural
households.

The experience of Taiwan thus seems to show that it takes an

active balanced rural growth strategy to improve the rural household distribu
tion of income.

Early land reform was probably responsible more for the initial

low level of the rural household Gini than for its favorable performance over
time in the context of rapid overall and agricultura l growth.
Moving on, secondly, to the urban families, we have already noted that
here the functional distributio n effect is most significant , and that its
impact on overall equity changes from mildly unfavorable before 1968 to
substantial ly favorable thereafter.

Our more detailed empirical findings

in this regard indicate that
7) property income arising out of non-agricu ltural activity is always
more unequally distributed than wage income and that
8) labor's share decreases slightly relative to the property share
before 1968 and increases relatively thereafter.
Together, these two results underline the growth sensitive nature of income
distributio n trends:

before the exhaustion of the labor surplus condition,

with labor's share falling, the functional distributio n effect was unfavorable
for the size distributio n of income; afterwards, with labor's share rising,
it became favorable.

Before 1968, with real unskilled wages relatively

stable due to the overhang of the reserve army of the tmderemploy ed, the
urban family's labor share declined slightly--th ough not nearly as much .as
predicted

py

Lewis et al.

Employment opportuniti es (and hours worked) did

not expand quite as much as was the case, relatively speaking, in the more
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labor-intensive rural non-agricultural activities discussed earlier.
sequently, we observe an extremely

11

Con

mild 11 version of the Kuznets effect here.

Once labor had become a scarce commodity, the marked acceleration of real
wage increases combined with the related rise in capital intensity (and greater
labor-saving technology bias at the margin), led to an increase in the wage
share, and a consequently strongly favorable impact on urban family income
distribution.
The policy conclusions emanating from· these findings seem quite straight
forward as well.

Apparently, while the Kuznets effect seems to be observed

here, it can be rendered so weak that things, even for the urban families
taken by themselves, only have to get a "little worse" before they can get
"much better."

The improvement of the distribution of income after labor

scarcity has set in is a "natural" phenomenon, in harmony with the views of
Lewis, Kuznets, etc.; the softening--and possibly complete avoidance--of any
deterioration before that point is less automatic and subject to policy,
including all actions directed to the reduction of existing distortions of
relative prices and technology choices which favor "unwarranted" or "premature"
capital intensity in both urban industrial techniques and output mixes.

But,

of course, the most reliable method of ensuring or improving the distribution
of income for the urban families is to hasten the advent of the turning point
itself--via an acceleration of a balanced intersectoral growth effort within
the dualistic economy setting.

12

l2Lots of further policy conclusions underl:ie this statement, with re
spect to the functioning of intersectoral commodity, financial and labor markets.
But these will not be elaborated here. The interested reader is referred to
Fei and Ranis, Development of the Labor Surplus Economy: Theory and Policy,
Irwin, 1964.
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Finally, taking all households together, we have further proof that, in
the presence of a substantial rural sector, there is nothing inevitable about
the appearance of a strong Kuznets effect in the course of rapid growth.

Our

quantitative findings indicate that
9) the factor Gini effect is dominant here.
Moreover, disaggregating further, we see that the improvement of the agricul
tural Gini battles the conventionally deteriorating non-agricultural Gini to
a virtual stand-off before 1968, with the reallocation and functional distri
bution effects both helpful.

The rising overall wage share--running counter

to most dual economy,Marxist and dependencia theorists--is especially note
worthy.

After 1968, the strong improvement via the non-agricultural Gini

effect, along with the now greater help emanating from the functional distri
bution effect, provides the expected results.
Overcoming the tendency for markedly increased inequality when rapid
growth first gets under way is, of course, the critical accomplishment.

In

the case of Taiwan, it was apparently achieved via the combination of a
functional distribution of non-agricultural income which did not turn against
labor, plus the consistent improvement in an initially badly distributed
agricultural income.

As we have already noted, both phenomena are related

to the early rural orientation, both in agriculture and non-agriculture, of
the Taiwan development effort.

Once the Kuznets effect is disaggregated in

this fashion, the inevitability of the implied early conflict between growth
and distribution tends to disappear.
Turning to a yet more disaggregated level of our analysis of income
distribution in Taiwan, we may note that
10) every wage Gini (i.e. for rural, urban or all families) lies below
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its property Gini.
But, while the unequal distribution of property income contributes more than
its weight to overall income inequality in each case, the overall contribu
tion of wage income, given its weight, is still greater.

Moreover,

11) every rural income Gini lies below its urban equivalent.
This indicates the existence of greater structural dualism in terms of the
inequality of property income and of labor force heterogeneity in the urban
areas.

These inter-sectoral gaps, incidentally, are seen to erode after

1968 when such structural differences between the sectors apparently tend
to lose their significance.
Additional research was undertaken to probe somewhat deeper into the
causes of wage income inequality, utilizing cross-tabulated data compiled
for the year 1966 only.

Our framework here recognizes the importance of

labor force heterogeneity-i n terms of differences in education, age, sex
and differences in family economic p·ower (proxied by total income) •
levels of analysis were employed:

Three

at the first level, we attempted an

explanation of the differentiated structure of wage rates as traced to the
above labor force characteristics ; at the second level, we tried to explain
the inequality of wage income as traced to the differential rate structure
plus

labor force composition; at the third level, finally, we tackled the

explanation of the inequality of family wage income traced, in addition, to
the membership composition of the various families.
At the first (and more conventional) level. we find that
12) urban areas seem to give greater weight to such Hunwarranted" causes
of wage rate differences as-sex and-family influence, than rural areas.
On the other hand,

13) premia paid for such

"warranted" causes as age and education

-16-

differentials are about the same regardless of location.
The policy conclusions here are obvious--if somewhat negative:

institutional

discrimination against females and members of poorer families exists and
should be removed, if possible--while no special effort is needed to render,
say, rural labor markets, more perfect.
With respect to the second level, the analysis of wage income inequality,
it is only here that we can address the issue as to the relative overall im
portance of the "warranted" as opposed to the

11

\lllwarranted" causes.

Our find

ing here is that
14) sex and family influence together amotm.t to only 33% of the total
differential.
This provides us with a warning as to what can be accomplished by a, presuma
bly not costless, policy aimed at totally eliminating this type of institu
tional discrimination.

The differential composition of the urban labor force,

apparently tends to compensate for the relatively greater scope for wage rate
discrimination, i.e. females and members of poor families get a relatively
larger share of the urban jobs.

Gradual urbanization can thus perhaps be

relied upon to achieve greater equity in the overall distribution of wage
income.
At the third level, the analysis of family wage income inequality, we
recognize that it is the W1equal family "ownership" pattern of this heteroge.
neous factor--even our crude classification yields almost 40 different grades-
which lies behind such inequality.

Our more specific finding is that

15) it is the 'llllequal family ownership of high grade labor (e.g., well
educated, prime age males) which is the most important cause of overall
family wage income inequality.
While very little can pr~sumably be done to affect the distribution of the
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family ownership of human assets with respect to age and sex, the same does
not hold for education.

Empirically, however, as far as the education charac

teristic is concerned, "the family" turns out to be insignificant as the
unit of ownership, i.e., the degree of inequality of wage income among, say,
1000 workers would remain about the same, regardless of whether or not their
family affiliations are taken into account.

This unexpected result is un

doubtedly related to the time-honored rigorous and impartial examination
system at all formal educational levels in Taiwan, rendering educational
opportunities relatively equal to all comers.

Any conclusions for policy

with an eye to achieving similar results elsewhere would·- have to contend
with the question of whether, in the absence of a similar long-standing
cultural bias, it is politically and institutionally feasible to establish
such a system.
Finally, other parts of our more disaggregate analysis permit us to
derive a number of conclusions relevant to the relationship between taxation
and the distribution of income.

Our most important empirical finding here

is that
16) the taxation system in Taiwan is approximately neutral with respect
to income distribution, i.e., the degree of inequality is about the
same before and after taxes.
A second, related, conclusion is that
17) the quantitatively more important and regressive indirect tax pay
ments about cancel the quantitatively less important and more pro
gressive direct tax payments.
The policy implication of this particular set of findings lends additional
support to our overall conclusion at the aggregate level, ·namely, that LDC
family income distribution performance is mainly a function of an appropriate
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"primary," i.e., growth-related, strategy and is difficult to achieve via
a "secondary"or after-the-fact redistribution strategy.

The possibility of

shifting from indirect to direct taxes, for example, runs up against a
number of other practical considerations in a system which relies heavily
on business saving and reinvestment.

Even when a government's political

and fiscal capacity is relatively strong, as is the case in Taiwan, rela
tively little can be expected from fiscal redistribution.

This conclusion

is further supported by the finding that
18) family transfer income in Taiwan contributes to overall family
income inequality rather than equality.

13

However, since its weight is small (less than 5% of total family income) its
contribution, on either side, is likely to remain negligible in the absence
of major fiscal reforms.
III.

On

Transferability

We are, of course, interested in the Taiwan case for its own sake.
Nevertheless, a basic purpose of an examination of a particular system's
experience should be to attempt to distill conclusions that may be
relevant to other developing societies as well as to determine which
features are so "special" to Taiwan that they are likely to be irrelevant
elsewhere.

The fact that most available cross-sectional and LDC time

series evidence points in the direction of a seemingly inevitable and
rather severe conflict between conventional measures of equity and growth
is well known.

Moreover, in human affairs the demonstration of the exis

tence of an exception to a general rule admittedly does not have the power
of a counter-example in mathematics.

13

What analysts and policymakers

I.e., it is a type II rather than a type III income, with richer
families receiving abosolutely more transfer income than poorer families.
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woul d there fore presu mabl y like to know is to
what exte nt the elem ents of
the grow th patt ern whic h appa rentl y led to a
lowe r leve l and more favo rable
time trend of the Gini coef ficie nt in Taiw an
are pres ent in more "typ ical"
deve lopin g coun tries and to what exte nt they
are not. An impo rtant dime n
sion of this ques tion is the exte nt to whic h
the obst acle s found to
obst ruct the achie veme nt of a simi lar outco me
in othe r cont exts are a func 
tion of impo rtant diffe renc es in the kind ness
of natu re and to what exte nt
of diffe renc es in inst ituti onal choi ces and/
or poli tica l will .
Ther e exis ts, of cour se, no such anim al as a
"typ ical" deve lopin g
economy. Nor, in the pres ent state of our know
ledge , can we reall y expe ct
to achie ve scie ntifi c com para bilit y by exam ining
the cont rasts and simi lari
ties betw een perfo rman ce in Taiw an and any othe
r spec ific deve lopin g soci ety.
Fina lly, and at leas t equa lly telli ng, we have
not had the oppo rtuni ty to
date to subj ect any othe r coun try situa tion
to a simi lar kind of anal ysis .
We do, howe ver, have more than curso .ry know ledge
of two othe r deve lopin g
soci etie s, Colo mbia and the Phil ippi nes, whic
h not only happ en to have
many simi larit ies with resp ect to each othe r
but are also , to the exte nt
such a state men t is at all mean ingfu l, clos er
to the "typ ical" LDC case ).4
With resp ect to the basi c trad e-of f issu e, both
have expe rienc ed a
resp ecta ble grow th perfo rman ce over the past
quar ter cent ury, in exce ss
of 6% annu ally on the aver age, but comb ined
with an outsp oken ly poor
reco rd on incom e dist ribu tion , with Gini 's in
the rang e abov e .5 and
prob ably risin g. In what follo ws we shal l attem
pt to exam ine the
tran sfer abil ity of Taiw an's expe rienc e with
refer ence to "Col phil, " an
amalgam of thes e two syste ms, in a nece ssar ily
rath er loos e and
impr essio nisti c fash ion. - To the exte nt poss
ible, we shal l of cour se try
14Even
"aty pica l".

then it is undo ubted ly easi er to get agree ment
that Taiwan is
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to relate our observations specifically to the main conclusions reached
in the examination of the Taiwan case.
Beginning again at the most aggregative level, we know that Taiwan and
Colphil have in common the decision to pursue an import substitution strate
gy in the immediate post-World War II era.

Yet, while primary, or consumer

goods, import substitution had begun somewhat earlier in Colphil, especially
in Latin America, this subphase was pretty much exhausted by the end of the

'50s in both cases.

Emerging out of a somewhat milder version of that parti

cular package of resource flows and policies, Taiwan then--not, incidentally,
without some filling and backing in the late '50s--determine d to move into
export substitution, i.e., focussing mainly on the participation of its
labor-intensive industrial consumer goods in international export markets.
Colphil, on the other hand, more or less stayed with the import substitution
package, but one focussed increasingly on previously imported durable
consumer goods, capital goods and the raw materials processing industries;
in more recent years, this policy syndrome has, moreover,-been complemented
by a strategy of export promotion which, recognizing the importance of
industrial exports, subsidizes same via special fiscal, interest rate and
other measures.

The obvious relative advantage of this Colphil strategy is

that it requires relatively little basic policy reform; as long as the "fuel"
which drives the system--essent ially traditional, land-based exports--lasts
(or can be supplemented by the discovery of new variants), politically
painful decisions associated with, for example, exchange rate, tariff and
interest rate reform can be avoided.
Our job here, it seems to me, is not to detail the by now well-known
elements of the Taiwan policy reforms of the '58-'63 period, or the
elements of the necessary intensificati.on of the secondary import substitution
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hothouse

temperature in Colphil, 15 but to discuss the effects of this

divergence--alo ng with others--on the growth/distribu tion nexus while
trying to differentiate among its avoidable and unavoidable causes.
Let us begin with the rural sector and rural households.

We have

seen above that the dominant cause of the relatively favorable income
distribution performance in Taiwan throughout the period was the so-called
reallocation effect which relates to the massive shift of rural households
from agricultural to non-agricultura l activities in the presence of a
dynamic agriculture and in the absence of massive rural/urban migration.
In Taiwan, agricultural output grew at an annual rate of 5.6% between
1953 and 1973; in Colphil, the rate was 3% to 4%; moreover, in Taiwan,
as we have seen, rural industry and services capable of absorbing
especially the poorest of the thus "freed" agricultural labor force
grew at rates at least equal to their urban counterparts.

In Colphil,

industrial activity is heavily concentrated; Manila conta.ins more than
80% of all industry and only the states containing Colombia's five major
cities have shown any growth in industrial employment over the past
decade.

The effect has been a relatively high total rural income Gini

in Colphil which has, at best, not worsened further over two deeades of
growth.
The reasons for the failure of balanced agricultural/no n-agricultural
rural growth to make its appearance in Colphil are, of course, central to
our purpose.

Taiwan clearly had the advantages of a compact island, a

15 Much more could, of course, be said at this level, but, since
it
already has been, ad n aiseum, the temptation is resisted
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relativ ely homogeneous popula tion and the strong heritag e of Japane se
colonia l physic al anq institu tional infrast ructur e investm ents in the
rural areas.

Not only the extensi ve road, irrigat ion and railway networ ks
I
'

(one of the highes t densit ies, either /per square kilome ter or per 1000
popula tion) but also the network of farmer s' associa tions and extensi on
service s were ready for a convers ion to a more divers ified nation al
develop ment-o riented post-co lonial use.

In Colphi l, both nature and

coloni al policie s were much less favora ble.

The Philipp ines represe nts

a country of many heterog eneous islands only weakly tied togethe r by
inland transp ort; Colombia is a country severe ly region alized by the
branch ing of the Andes with interna l transp ort notorio usly inadeq uate.
In both cases, coloni al policy was more exclus ively oriente d towards the
expans ion and export of the major cash crops.

Food produc ing agricu lture

(which happene d to be the "colon ial crop" in Taiwan) was virtua lly
neglec ted.

In both Taiwan and Colphi l, howeve r, coloni al policy had

discour aged domest ic indust ry, certain ly that owned by domest ic entre~
praneu rs, and much indigen ous small- scale rural indust rial activit y
of the artisan type was, in fact, destroy ed by importe d factory -made
goods¼ 6 But the initia l conditi ons for post-c olonia l balance d rural
growth were obviou sly very differe nt--esp ecially when we add educat ional
and cultur al differe nces to the gap in rural prepare dness already
referre d to.
But what is perhap s most remark able is the contra st in the actions
taken by the post-in depend ence governm ents in the two cases.

Taiwan

continu ed to invest heavily in its decent ralized infrast ructur e:
16

its

See S. Resnic k, '~Colon ial Development in Southe ast Asia: A Comparison
Among Burma, Philipp ines and Thailan d, 1870 to 1938", Journa l of Econom
ic
History , 1970 (for the Philipp ines) and W. P. McGreevey, An Economic History
9:L Colomb ia, 1971 (for Colomb ia).
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rural highways remained at over 60% of the total and the percentage
paved rose from 7% to 50%; the farmers' association structure was con
verted and strengthened; and, perhaps most important, agriculture's
terms of trade were not permitted to deteriorate even during the import
substitution subphase.

In Colphil, on the other hand, little effort was

made to make up for this colonial deficit in the rural areas; the atten
tion instead was heavily focussed on the urban-industrial complexes.
In 1960, to cite but one example, Taiwan had 79 research workers per
100,000 population in agriculture, in contrast to 1.6 in the Philippines.
Agriculture continued to be discriminated against, directly and indirectly
in Colphil.

In Taiwan, rural industry ~till produced 60% of all consumer

goods and provided 50% of total manufacturing employment in the early
'70s, in contrast to figures in the vicinity of 10% in Colphil.

In

addition to a more favorable overall policy environment, e.g., an
interest rate and import allocation policy which favors the relatively
smaller, rural enterprises, Taiwan also encouraged rural industry
directly via a rural electrification grid, the maintenance of equality
in power and fuel rates as between rural and urban locations, and the
establishment of rural-industrial estates, bonded factories and
processing zones located with an eye to rural labor location and
mobility.

Colphil's energy distribution and rate structure, along with

that governing the many other directly allocated inputs and favors, is
clearly biased in favor of the urban large-scale sector: 7

In the absence

of a more equally distributed non-agricultural income to shift to,this

17

The Philippine Secretary of Industries told me several years ago that
he is prepared to grant the usual fiscal incentives to all origins and sizes
of industrialists "as long as they can open a branch office in Manila."
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important source of income distribution
largely inoperative.

amelioration under growth was

We may thus conclude that, while geographic,

cultural and historical antecedents undoubtedly gave Taiwan an initial
relative advantage with respect to the development of rural industries
and services in a balanced growth context, it is also clear that rela
tive post-colonial government policies exacerbated rather than
diminished this gap in the initial conditions.
Closely related, of course, is the issue of the relative labor
intensity over time of existing rural industry and services.

This, it

will be recalled, affected favorably the distribution of income of rural
families in Taiwan via the functional distribution effect, as non
agricultural incomes rose in importance relative to agricultural incomes.
The relative share of labor, a reflection of labor intensity under con
ventional assumptions within rural non-agriculture , was at approximately
.6 in 1964 and rose to a remarkable .7 plus by 1968.

It was this increase

in jobs for members of the poorest rural families, along with the increase
in hours of employment demanded per person, which yielded the

unexpected

increase in labor's relative share during a time of labor surplus.

In

Colphil, the level of capital intensity, a function of technology and
output mixes combined, for this relatively small rural non-agricultur al
subsector, was much higher, yielding a relative share of labor between
.3 and .4.

There is no evidence here, in other words, of the gradual

shift from relatively more capital-intensi ve food-based industries, such
as sugar, to the more labor-intensive imported raw materials-based
industries, such as garments.

Nor, given the overall policy environment,

is there the same pressure for the adoption, and adaptation, of more
labor-using kinds of technology within given industries.
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A third factor favorable to the observed level and trend of rural
household income distribution in Taiwan, while not showing up as quan
titatively dominant in our decomposition results, is, as noted earlier,
embodied in the continuously improving agricultural Gini effect.

The

initially low (by international standards) level of the agricultural
income Gini is undoubtedly largely a function of the two land reforms
consummated on the island, the colonial reform of 1905 and the independent
three-step reforms of 1949-53.

Together they virtually eliminated large

holdings, placed ceilings on rents and lowered the relative evaluation
of landed versus industrial assets.

Colphil to date has no comparable

record of successful land reform to point to--though some initial
serious efforts were made in Colombia in the late '60s and are currently
under way in the Philippines. 18 Taiwan's ability to carry through with a
rather thorough-going set of land reforms can, of course, be explained in
terms of the relative (political) ease with which a non-indigenous ruling
elite (Japan in the first instance, the migrant Mainland government in the
second) could impose land reform on others.

But it should also be

recalled that what really motivated the reforms of '49-'53 was the
recent history of social inequity followed by disintegration and
revolution on the Mainland.

In any case, the reforms left only 17% of

the land in tenant hands, with 60% owner-farmers and the rest at least
partially in that category.

18

Undoubtedly, both the agricultural growth

Colombia's land ownership Gini is around .8 and probably
worsening again. But even if the announced goals were to be reached,
Colphil's land reform program is much more modest than Taiwan's in
terms of retention limits, compensation schemes, etc.
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performance which followed as well as the favorable level of the Gini
owe much to this initial structural reform.
In order to understand the decline of the agricultural Gini during
the post-1953 period under observation, however, we have already
referred to the increasing importance of double cropping and new, more
labor-intensive and higher valued crops, such as mushrooms and asparagus,
for labor absorptjon, especially among the poorer families.
record is radically different in this regard.

Colphil's

Not only is labor used

much less intensively per unit of land even in the labor surplus islands
(or regions)--partly due to the less equal distribution of the land

19

-

but the more limited volume of diversification has favored the relatively
more capital-intensive crops. 20

In Colombia, for example, labor's share

in agricultural income was .38 in 1950 and .24 in 1970.

This low level

and worsening trend are partly due to the distorted relative price signals
and other policies favoring early indiscriminate mechani~ation-~and
partly due to the continued overall government concentration on export
markets for old·aa.a·new cash crops. In any case, the possibility of
lower income families, and especially landless workers, being absorbed
in rural employment, agricultural as well as non-agricultural, is much
lower in Colphil.

While the group of landless,or virtually landless,

agricultural workers was virtually non-existent in post-reform Taiwan,

19 See the work of Albert Berry, for instance (Colombian Agriculture,
to be published).
20The current coffee stampede in Colombia represents something
of a, probably temporary, exception.
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in Colombia it constituted almost 48% of the total agricultural popula
tion in 1938, approximately 56% in the early '50s and still above 50%
today.

Similarly in the Philippines, the land reform has increased the

number,and worsened the situation, of the landless agricultural workers.
As

Berry has pointed out, unemployment among such workers, if land

reform is not accompanied by an increase in labor absorbing activities,
may well be a major cause of a worsening rural distribution of income.
The combined effect of the policies of relative agricultural neglect
and of the neglect of rural non-agricultural activities in Colphil has thus
been to deny members of the poorer rural families a chance to become
productively absorbed in relatively labor-intensive activities away from
big cities.

But aside from the ~pecific direct and indirect dimensions

of public sector policy already referred to, designed to elicit such very
different private sector responses; there is also the question of the
different ways in which the public sector organizes itself for action
in the rural areas of the mixed economy.

In Taiwan, while the central

government was certainly strong, a good deal of decentralization was
achieved, most markedly by means of the conversion of the farmers'
associations to "bottoms up" instruments of rural development.

With

line departments and the JCRR {Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction)
providing the technical and credit inputs, the decisions as to what
infrastructure was required and where were

thoroughly'local ones.

In ·colphil, by contrast, decision-making with respect to both the alloca
tion and the character of public sector overhead facilities is thoroughly
centralized.

The disdain for local public sector capacities at the barrio

or sub-municipio level runs deep.

Even the age-old refrain of the

"stupid peasant" has surprising survival value and is supplemented by the
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dim view generally taken of the existence of requisite entrepreneurial
and technical capacities among would-be medium
industrialists.

and small-scale rural

To the extent rural infrastructural investments are

informed by the "felt needs" of private individuals, these are more
likely to reflect the needs of the elite for additional windfall profits,
as, for example, in the case of the 17 major irrigation projects in
Colombia or the penetration highways in the Philippines.

Such urban

oriented elitist attitudes and actions are, of course, subject to
change, for example, via a restructuring of government careers which
makes rural service an obligation and via the devolution

of fiscal,

planning and some investment functions to the appropriate local level.
Moving on to the urban family distribution of income, we should
quickly recall that the main reason for the observed virtual elimination
of the Kuznets effect in Taiwan was ·the functional distribution effect,
specifically the maintenance of a surprisingly high labor share in urban
industrial cum service activities, even before the end of labor surplus.
The maintenance of a labor-intensive output mix and technologies is,
of course, intimately tied up with the relative mildness of primary
import substitution combined with the thoroµgh liberalization efforts
which followed.

In Colphil, the situation is quite different.

Relative

product and factor price distortions have a tendency to become more
severe with time as the distance between endowments and deployments
widens.

Capital intensity is thus likely to be initially much higher

and rising, with labor's relative share lower and falling.

While Taiwan's

-

non-agricultural labor share was at .57 in 1964 and 1968, rising further
(to .63), as we would expect,by 1972, Colphil's labor share is generally
around .4 and falling.

Although the unlimited supply of labor condition
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generally obtains here as well, e.g., real wages have observed virtual
constancy

if not a slight decline

over the past two decades, employ

ment opportunities as a function of technology choices exercised and
technology change induced (at the margin) lagged increasingly behind
output growth.

This result springs from a long list of policies, already

referred to in the rural industry context, distorting production tech
niques and output mixes against the use of labor.

A good example is the

contrast between the employment creating features of labor•intensive
export substitution, in which medium- and small-scale industry participates
actively, as in Taiwan, and the capital-intensive large firm-oriented nature
of the export promotion efforts, as in. Colphil. 21

An instructive example

which serves to underline the contrast is ~h~-M-:f:ference .,between the Bataan
Export Processing Zone in the Philippines--with the

Ford Motor Company as

one typical tenant--and the electronics assembly activities in the Kaohsiung
txport Processing Zone in Taiwan.
Taking the urban families separately, the Taiwan experience demon
strates that any early deterioratien in the distribution_ '?£,income ~an be
substantially softened, if not totally avoided.

Howev~r, the OI}ly _$µre

~

method of achieving a sustained improvement in equity lies in hastening the
advent of commercialization, i.e., the end of the labor surplus condition.
In the case of Taiwan, moving from land-intensive import to labor-intensive
export substitution, this target was achieved, via less than two decades
of balanced growth.

In the case of Colphil, which continues to pursue a

basically land-intensive import substitution strategy, it is not at all

2 lsee, for example, the work of Carlos Diaz~Alejandro with respect
to the promotion of minor exports in post-1967 Colombia,(Foreign Trade Regimes
and Economic Development in Colomlid..a, NBER, 1976).
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clear that the rate of non-agricultural labor absorption is gaining on
the population or labor force growth rate; if it is, it is not by a
sufficient margin to give promise of an early successful mopping up ·of
the existing pool of underemployed and unemployed labor.

The groundwork has, in this fashion, hopefully also been laid for
a judgment concerning the overall relevance of the Taiwanese experience
for Colphil, with the income distribution of all families in m;ind.

Success

in this general sense was clearly based en the eombination of thre~

key ingredients:

the presence of a substantial and increasing volume

of non-agricultural employment opportunities in the rural areas; a
functional distribution of non-agricultural income which did not turn
against labor in the presence of persist,ently low wage rates; and a
consistently improving distribution of agricultural income.

The

requisite policies underlying the achievement of these results have
been spelled out equally clearly:

early attention to agriculture in terms

of both asset redistribution and the encouragement of productivity increase
even during a period generally focussed on import substituting indus
trialization; a decentralized rural social overhead and industrialization
strategy; an overall economic policy environment which increasingly
forced output mixes and technology choices into greater harmony with
changing endowment conditions.
At the more disaggregate levels of the analysis carried out for
Taiwan, only a few points require our attention here.

For example, with

respect to the analysis of the causes of wage income inequality, it is
a priori doubtful that the premia paid for its "unwarranted" causes,
e.g., family connection and sex, are as relatively unimportant in Colphil
as they turned out to be in Taiwan; certainly where educational access
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influence, there should be substantially more scope for government action
to redress the situation.

Given public education with access based on

merit, and skill demands related to output demand patterns--rather than
independent screening requirements--an education cum science budget
which rose from 8% of the total in 1953 to 15% in 1968, as in Taiwan,

can be very helpful in ensuring greater wage income equality across
families.

ijowever, where educational expenditures {public plus private)

are large but educational access is related to family position and the
ability to pay, and where the educational product is used to facilitate
selection procedures for functionally unrelated positions, as in Colphil,

income inequities are likely to be thereby maintained and accentuated across
the generations.

The policy conclusions relevant to Colphil are at the

same time obvious and difficult to implement, given the political and
socio-economic structure of society.

Similarly, the impact of early unionization on the wage structure
and hence on income distribution, irrelevant to the case of Taiwan, is
relevant in Colphil.

Artificially higher industrial wages for the

employed elite, as long as labor surplus persists, is but one manifesta
tion of the import substitution policy nexus already referred to; it
renders capital intensity and labor-saving innovations more attractive
and income distribution outcomes less favorable, by virtue of the weakening
of the functional distribution effect, on the one hand, and the postponement
of the advent of general labor scarcity, on the other.

With respect, finally, to the impact of taxes on the distribution
of income, the evidence for Colphil is similar to that for Taiwan, i.e.,

the effects of progressive direct and regressive indirect taxes more or
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less cancel out leaving a_fter tax distribution essentially unaffected.
Moreover, transfer payments in both cases, though small, contribute to
income inequality, rather than equality, 1.e., the relatively richer
families obtain absolutely more than the relatively poorer families. 22
These findings thus lend further support to our basic notion that,
at least in the mixed developing economy, easing the conflict between
growth and distribution can be accomplished mainly through the kind
of growth path which is pursued in the first place.

Patching up,

after the (production) fact, even if the intentions are good, is not
likely to work.

Income distrib.ution policies cannot be divorced from

growth policies, and this means, in turn, that any conflict can be
eased, if not eliminated, within every subphase of the transition
process.

Since good growth theory, hence distribution theory, must

be typologically sensitive, different types of LDC's, e.g., of the
large, or the labor-short,or the oil-rich type, would undoubtedly require
a different policy focus.

But for the garden variety of LDC, the Col

phils of this world, critical elements of the Taiwan experience are
substantially relevant.
Taiwan undoubtedly had some unique advantages, in terms of its initial
geographic and cultural homogeneity, its high quality human infrastructure

22

Notice that we are not concerned here with the possible redistri
butive effects of government expenditures on health, education, housing,
etc. Impressions gained in both the Philippines and Colombia would, however,
lead us to share Bardhan's view (in Chenery et al Redistribution with Growth),
on the basis of Indian experience, that it is generally the middle class,
not the poor, which benefits from such efforts.
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and the "good luck" to have had a rurally oriented colonial master.
But, it should also be recalled that she started out with some rather
unique disadvantages as well, not shared by many other contemporary
LDC's.

These include a very unfavorable initial natural resources

endowment and man/l~d ratio, and the need

to- overcome two

traumatic political/economic events, retrocession·to China and
separation from the Mainland, almost at birth.
the irrelevance of Taiwan

Those who insist on

as a heavily aided U.S. satellite should

be reminded of at least three additional facts:

One, the quantity of

foreign capital inflows, first aid, then private investment, in the
course of the two-decade transition was, in fact, modest, amounting to only
6% of the total c4mulative investment; while such flows were undoubtedly
qualitatively helpful at critical points in time, such as for the stabiliza
tion effort in the early '50s and the transition to export substitution
in the early '60s, not every heavily aided LDC has used equivalent flows
equally wisely.

Two, the proportion of total resources Taiwan felt it

had to spend on national defense--a distinct disadvantage--was roughly
equal to the proportion of foreign capital inflows.

Finally, its

position as a 11U. S. satellite 1•1has not exempted it from the imposition
of tough quota restrictions in the areas of its greatest export substitu
tion successes, e.g., textiles.
Much of what has been accomplished in Taiwan resulted, in•faet, from
her own efforts.

Favorable initial conditions were further fortified;

early asset redistribution was followed by the timely use of the market
mechanism--both unpopular measures--to achieve given social goals.

If

the argument is made that it was easier to achieve a social consensus
given a strong government acting on Japanese or politically weak indigenous
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interests, the point is well taken; but being able to dispose over a much
better natural resource base as lubricant, as in the Colphil case, should
also make it easier to pick the right moment to persuade vested interests
(both landed and industrial) that a change in policy is in their own longer
run interest.

What has been happening instead is that these traditional

flows have been used as a tranquilize r permitting Colphil governments to
put off the day of reckoning.

While Taiwan was undoubtedly "up against it"

and could not enjoy the same luxury, how long current Colphil strategy,
which continues to emphasize (by its actions, if not its rhetoric) the
traditional method of generating growth, can last is anybody's (but not an
economist's ) guess.

It is one thing to understand the political economy

reasons for not offending vested interests if there seems to be no innninent
need to do so--certain ly not within the lifetime of a given administrat ion;
it is quite another to quickly embrace the convenient judgement that an
alternative set of societal decisions is technically and/or politically ,
irrelevant.

